Effect of interaction strength on the evolution of cooperation by Wenfeng, Feng et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
20
9.
26
12
v2
  [
cs
.G
T]
  1
3 S
ep
 20
12
Effect of interaction strength on the evolution of
cooperation
Wenfeng Feng
School of Computer Science & Tech-
nology,Henan Polytechnic University
Email: fengwf@hpu.edu.cn
Yang Li
School of Computer Science & Tech-
nology,Henan Polytechnic University
Email:wuseguang@163.com
Junhao Yan
School of Computer Science & Tech-
nology,Henan Polytechnic University
Abstract—Cooperative behaviors are ubiquitous in na-
ture,which is a puzzle to evolutionary biology, because the
defector always gains more benefit than the cooperator,thus,the
cooperator should decrease and vanish over time.This typical
”prisoners’ dilemma” phenomenon has been widely researched
in recent years.The interaction strength between cooperators and
defectors is introduced in this paper(in human society,it can be
understood as the tolerance of cooperators). We find that only
when the maximum interaction strength is between two critical
values, the cooperator and defector can coexist,otherwise, 1) if it
is greater than the upper value, the cooperator will vanish, 2) if
it is less than the lower value,a bistable state will appear.
Index Terms—cooperation,evolutionary game the-
ory,interaction strength,tolerance,Prisoners Dilemma,population
dynamics
I. INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary game theory is an efficient way to study
evolutionary dynamics,where the fitness of a phenotype is
dependent on its frequency relative to other phenotypes in a
given population.Different phenotypes compete according to
their fitness,the phenotype with greater fitness grow faster and
the lesser grow slower.In the end,the competitive phenotype
will survive and the weak vanish.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is a typical model to in-
vestigate this problem.In this game,there are two players:a
cooperator and a defector.In each round,if the two players
are both cooperators,every one will receive R,and if both
defectors,they will receive P,a defector can get T by exploiting
a cooperator,and the cooperator is left S.In PD,the Condition
T>R>P>S should be met.Below is the payoff matrix for this
game.
C D
C R S
D T P
Without loss of generality,we assume the size of the pop-
ulation is 1,and the frequency of cooperators is x,defectors
y, obviously, x+y=1.The fitness of cooperator and defector is
denoted by fc and fd respectively.Thus,in each round:
fC = xR+ yS (1.1a)
fD = xT + yP (1.1b)
let x˙ = dx/dt, y˙ = dy/dt,so the evolution equations are:
x˙ = x(fC − φ) (1.2a)
y˙ = y(fD − φ) (1.2b)
Where φ = xfC + yfD denotes the mean fitness,above
equations are also called the replicator equations[2].
Because fD − fC = x(T − R) + y(P − S) > 0,so in the
end only the defectors exist in the population,which contradict
the real world,since the cooperators always coexist with the
defectors in real world.
Cooperation is always vulnerable to exploitation by de-
fectors.Hence,the evolution of cooperation requires specific
mechanisms,which allow natural selection to favor cooperation
over defection.There had been five mechanisms for the evolu-
tion of cooperation[3], [8]: direct reciprocity[4], [1], indirect
reciprocity[5], kin selection, group selection[10], and network
reciprocity [6](or graph selection).Recently, a mechanism was
provided that variable population densities and interaction
group sizes can favor the cooperation[12]. But,these mech-
anisms do not take into account that the cooperators could
adapt to the change of population frequency and adjust their
interaction strength with the defectors. This lead to a nat-
ural feedback between population dynamics and interaction
strength, and favor the evolution of cooperation.
Fig. 1. Interaction strength.
II. INTERACTION STRENGTH FUNCTION
Here,we introduce a function f(x) to represent the variation
of interaction strength according to the frequency of cooper-
ators(see Fig.1).It is easy to understand that the cooperators
could adjust their interaction strength with the defectors ac-
cording to the frequency of themselves.Thus,the strength of
a cooperator interacts with a defector is f(x),and refuse a
defector is 1-f(x).Now,the fitness formula (1.1) are translated
into the following formula:
fC = xR+ yf(x)S (2.1a)
fD = xf(x)T + yP (2.1b)
We study three forms of the interaction strength function f(x):
1) f(x) is a constant.In this situation the cooperator
will interact with the defector at a fix strength.Specially,if
f(x)=0,cooperators and defectors interact by no means;if
f(x)=1,the traditional replicator dynamics is recovered.
2)f(x) is a monotone increasing function about x.In this
situation the interaction strength increase along with the fre-
quency of cooperators.Here it can be understood that the more
cooperators there are,the more likely they are tolerant,and vice
versa(see Fig.2).This conforms to our common sense.
3)f(x) is a monotonic decreasing function about x,this
situation is contrary to 2), and it is rarely appear in real world.
Fig. 2. Interaction strength when f(x) is a monotone increasing function about
x.In this situation the interaction strength increase along with the frequency of
cooperators.Here it can be understood that the more cooperators there are,the
more likely they are tolerant.
In next section we will discuss the situation 1) and 2)
respectively,we will show that a fix interaction strength can’t
give rise to coexist,only when the cooperators adjust their
interaction strength in direct proportion to their frequency can
lead to coexist.
III. POPULATION DYNAMICS BASED ON INTERACTION
STRENGTH
For simplicity and without loss of generality,we consider a
simpler payoff matrix[13]:
C D
C 1 0
D 1+r r
where r mean how the profitable unilateral defection is,r ∈
(0, 1).
A. f(x) is a constant
Here,let f(x)=p,p is a constant and p ∈ (0, 1).Now the two
players’s fitness are as follows:
fC = x (3.1a)
fD = px(1 + r) + yr (3.1b)
substitute y=1-x into (1.2),we get:
x˙ = x(1 − x)g(x) (3.2a)
where
g(x) = (1 + r)(1 − p)x− r (3.2b)
Let D(x) = x˙,solve equation D(x)=0,we get three fix points
x∗ = 1,0 and r/[(1 + r)(1 − p)].Below are details about the
three situations(see Fig.3):
1)x∗ = 0,here,D′(x) = −r < 0,so x∗ = 0 is a steady point.
2)x∗ = 1,here,D′(x) = p(1+r)−1,when p < 1/(1+r),it’s
a steady point, otherwise it’s unstable.
3)x∗ = r/[(1 + r)(1 − p)],here in order to ensure x∗ ∈
(0, 1),the condition must be met: p < 1/(1 + r).When p <
1/(1 + r),D′(x) > 0,so it’s a unstable point.
Fig. 3. The cure of x˙ when p take different values.(a)p < 1/(1 + r),it’s
bistable state.(b)p > 1/(1 + r),it’s monostability.We can see no matter what
value p takes ,they can’t coexist.
In conclusion,when f(x) is a constant,cooperators and de-
fectors can not coexist.If p > 1/(1 + r),the population will
be dominated by defectors in the end;if p < 1/(1 + r),the
populations will be homogenous population in the end,as for
which dominate the population,it depends on the initial fre-
quency,if x0 < r/[(1 + r)(1− p)] the defectors win,otherwise
the cooperators win(see Fig.4).
B. f(x) is a monotone increasing function
Here, f(x) is a monotone increasing function, for simplic-
ity,we let f(x)=kx,where k is a positive constant.Note f(x) ∈
[0, k],k can be thought as the max interaction strength or the
max tolerance.In this situation,their fitness are as follows:
fC = x (3.3a)
fD = k(1 + r)x
2 + yr (3.3b)
Fig. 4. Selection Dynamic, corresponding to Fig.3
substitute y=1-x into (5),we get:
x˙ = x(1− x)g(x) (3.4a)
where
g(x) = −k(1 + r)x2 + (1 + r)x − r (3.4b)
Let D(x) = x˙,solve equation D(x)=0,we get two boundary
points x∗ = 1, 0 and two internal points x1, x2,they are two
roots of equation g(x)=0. Below are details about these points.
1) dynamics on boundary points: Below is the dynamics
on points x∗ = 0 and x∗ = 1.
x∗ = 0, In this situation, D′(0) = g(0) = −r < 0,so
x∗ = 0 is a unstable point.
x∗ = 1, In this situation, D′(1) = −g(1) = k+rk−1,when
k < 1/(1+r),it’s a steady point,otherwise,it’s a unstable point.
2) dynamics on internal points: In this situation,there are
two fix points denoted by x1, x2,they are two roots of the
parabolic equation g(x)=0,suppose x1 6 x2. At first, To ensure
the existence of the solution, △ = (1 + r)(1 + r − 4rk) > 0
must be satisfyed,that is,
k 6 0.25(1 + 1/r) (3.5)
Note x1x2 = k(1 + r)/r > 0 and x1 + x2 = 1/k > 0,we
know x1 > 0, x2 > 0.Note D′(x∗) = (1 − x∗)x∗g′(x∗),so to
determine the stability of the two points, it’s only necessary
to consider the situation of g′(x∗).Below is the discussion of
the stability of the two point(see Fig.5).
1) x1 < 1, x2 < 1,to ensure this,g(1) < 0 and (x1+x2)/2 <
1 must be satisfied,that is,k > 1/(1 + r)must be satisfied.In
this situation, we get g′(x1) > 0 and g′(x2) < 0,so x1 is
unstable and x2 is stable.
2)x1 < 1, x2 > 1,to ensure this,g(1) > 0 and (x1+x2)/2 <
1 must be satisfied,that is,k < 1/(1 + r) must be satisfied.In
this situation, there is only one internal point x1,and it is
unstable.
3)x1 > 1, x2 > 1,to ensure this,g(1) < 0 and (x1+x2)/2 >
1 must be satisfied,that is,k > 1/(1+ r) and k < 0.5 must be
satisfied,because 1/(1 + r) < 0.5, so this condition can never
be met, so there is at least one internal point.
3) Summary: By §3.1 and §3.2,let k1 = 1/(1 + r), k2 =
0.25(1+ 1/r), x1 and x2 are the smaller root and larger root
of equation g(x)=0 respectively.The conclusions are drawn as
follows:
1) If k < k1,x=1 and x=0 are bistable state,the demarcation
point is x1.
2) If k1 < k < k2,x=0 and x = x2 are stable points,x = x1
is unstable point.The cooperators and defectors can coexist on
the point x = x2,but when x < x1,the cooperators will still
become extinct.
3) If k > k2,there is no internal point,x=0 is the global sta-
ble point,and x=1 is the global unstable point,in the end,only
the defectors exist in the population.
Fig. 5. The cure of x˙ when k takes different values.
Fig. 6. Selection Dynamic, corresponding to Fig.5
4) Numerical simulation: Here,we simulate this model with
computer,where f(x)=kx,r=0.2.At t=0,there are 50 original
states say x = {x1, x2 · · ·x50},each is a random float in
(0,1).In each time step,
x(t) = x(t− 1) + x˙× step
Where step mean step size,here step=1.The result is shown in
Fig.7.
Fig. 7. Numerical simulation on f(x)=kx,r=0.2. corresponding to Fig.5.Note
(d) is a semi-stable point,that means on this point,the states will decay to the
point x=0 in a ”Half-Life” form.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a general metaphor for the
problem of cooperation[9], [7], [11],in this paper,we introduce
the interaction strength,which leads to coexist of cooperators
and defectors.
It’s shown that when interaction strength is constant,it can
not leads to coexist.This suggests that it’s unwise for the
cooperators to be fixed and unchangeable to the defectors.
When the interaction strength is a monotone increasing
function about the frequency of cooperators,there is a max
interaction strength.Only when the max interaction strength
is between two critical value,the cooperator and defector can
coexist.The two critical points is 1/(1+r) and (1+r)/(4r) denoted
by k1 and k2 respectively.Note that 1+r is the payoff of a
defector to plunder a cooperator,r is the payoff of a defector
meet a defector,1 is the payoff of a cooperator meeting a
cooperator.So k1 can be understood as the ratio of the payoff
of a cooperator to the payoff of a defector when they meet the
same cooperator,the same to k2.
In general PD payoff matrix with b and c as follows:
C D
C b-c -c
D b 0
where a cooperator cost c to give his partner b.Note,r cor-
respond to c/b,1 corresponds to b,we can get the following
formula:
b
b+ c
< k <
b + c
4c
where k means the max interaction strength or the max tolera-
bility.In social life,the cooperator can be seen as producer,and
the defector predator.From the above formula we can see if the
max tolerability is in between b/(b+c) and (b+c)/(4c) the both
can coexist,which is a general phenomenon in most society,if
it’s greater than (b+c)/(4c),it will leads to social instability,
if it’s smaller than b/(b+c),it will towards a society in which
almost everyone is a cooperator.
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